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WHAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT SEX
DIFFERENCES
Joseph Adelson*
I can think of few activities more enervating emotionally than
to survey the psychological literature on sex differences. I first did
so about 15 years ago, soon after the birth of contemporary American feminism, and was taken aback by the gap between the actual,
enfeebled state of our knowledge, and the dogmatic self-assertion of
so much then being written on the topic.
Since that time, things both have and have not changed. What
has changed is the sheer quantity of work done or in progress, a
dearth having become a glut; what has not changed is our depth of
understanding. The abundance of new data has produced no breakthroughs, no new insights, and few bases for changes of heart or
mind. If you believed fifteen years ago that sex differences, the important ones, were at bottom biological in origin, you would have
no compelling reason to believe otherwise today. If you were a doctrinaire environmentalist then, you would still be so today. In
either case, you could muster far more support for your position
than previously, as in fact you could for all positions between the
extremes. So one major reason to be dispirited is the strong sense
one gets of a discipline merely treading water-it is depressing to
read through dozens of laborious articles reporting minor variations
on this or that empirical theme, to find that in the end they add up
to little in the way of enhanced understanding.
To some considerable degree, these problems reflect a larger set
of problems we find in social science generally: given a complex
topic, it is extraordinarily difficult to obtain secure, non-trivial findings, and to articulate compelling or even heuristic theoretical models. The optimism we once had about the powers of social science,
our belief that it would soon clarify and help resolve a wide range of
social and psychological troubles-that optimism, so strongly felt in
the 1950's and 1960's, now seems heady if not utopian.
Yet these generic problems are compounded, within the do* Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan. This article originally appeared
in the Spring, 1985, issue of NEW PERSPECTIVES.
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main of sex differences research, by the tendentious intentions of so
many investigators. It is not merely that so many seem drawn to
the topic because of an overweening personal interest; beyond that,
we see a steady erosion of that necessary line between scientific disinterestedness and ideological purpose. It is not true in all cases,
perhaps not even in most; but it is common enough to force a wariness upon the reader who can no longer assume that some tainting
or tilting either of facts or interpretation, whether witting or unwitting, is an event either rare or guarded against. Indeed, some scholars in this area have become quite open about their intentions,
proclaiming that their aim is to support their "values" through the
medium of research. Many others are not quite so bold publicly,
but will talk freely in private about what they expect their findings
to demonstrate, and how it will lead to the betterment of humankind. Still others take to wearing two hats, playing the role of the
objective scientist part of the time, and that of the activist while
speaking to the press or in public appearances. In all of these instances we find a touching faith in the power of the scientific
method to help keep one's partisan passions at bay, a faith often
misplaced. Yet in some cases, as we will see later, the belief in the
scientific method itself has waned, there being the view that science
is masculinist, thereby keeping us from larger and truer truths.
One would like to believe that so far not too much has been
lost. The more carefully refereed journals, like Psychology Bulletin,
are unlikely to print egregiously biased articles, and those journals
remain the most prestigious. That is indeed comfort, but rather
smaller than it may appear, since only a fraction of the total range
of research is subjected to close scrutiny. Futhermore, neither trade
nor textbooks are carefully refereed, from the point of view of scholarly balance, and these tend to receive favorable attention in both
the scholarly and general press, as long as they follow current fashion. Still futher, those books tend to be selected for use in collegelevel courses in women's studies, many of which are exercises in
political indoctrination. Thus we find texts which seem given over
monotonously to complaints or rationalizations, all differences between the sexes, including those seemingly favorable to women,
seen as connected to discrimination or to invidious forms of childrearing. In one recent text, for example, the male advantage in spatial perception is seen as an outcome of girls' being dissuaded from
participation in sports, whereas the female advantage in verbal ability evokes the comment that despite this advantage, women are not
allowed to use these gifts to the fullest.
The problem of bias has been exacerbated by the dubious posi-
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tions taken by some of the scholarly associations, now given over to
the propagation of liberal or leftist political causes. Much of the
American Orthopsychiatric Association's annual program is devoted to agit-prop; issues on the feminist agenda are not given objective discussion. That division of the American Psychological
Association presumably devoted to the study of feminine psychology has shown a quick and unseemly devolution from the sponsorship of research to the promotion of feminist causes, including some
which do not, logically speaking, have much to do with feminism
per se, such as the support of both male and female homosexuality.
The sad fact is that it has become nearly impossible to tell the difference between a scholarly meeting and a political caucus, and what is
worse, there seem to be few within the societies willing to complain,
or even call attention to what would have been deemed, just a few
years ago, a scandalous situation.
Hence, much of social science scholarship, rather than helping
to solve these inherently difficult questions, participates in or contributes to the irresponsibility with which these issues are discussed
in public discourse. A certain frivolousness in dealing even with
simple facts is now so commonplace as to be nearly normative.
Consider the straightforward question of differences in earnings between the sexes. One hears a great many assertions made on this
matter, nearly all false or misleading. A moment's thought leads us
to the understanding that wage differences are due to the fact that
the two sexes usually do not do the same work or have the same
history of continuity or seniority in the job, two factors being the
major determinants of wages in the marketplace. Yet these facts
have not prevented feminists from pointing to the "59 percent wage
gap" as evidence of discrimination in the market, despite the fact
that this statistic is based on gross comparisons between male and
female incomes.
This essay concerns itself not with wage rates or labor economics, but with psychological sex differences, questions having to do
with variations in ability, emotions, drives, personal traits, and the
like. The reason I mention differential earnings is to provide a foretaste of the problems lying in wait. Money is one of the simplest
variables we can imagine-it is tangible, quantifiable, morally neutral, and universally understood. The literature on sex differences
typically deals with variables extraordinarily complex and elusivesuch qualities as aggressiveness or dependency or moral outlook.
Such qualities are intangible, difficult to quantify, morally controversial or ambigous, and the source of considerable confusion and
disagreement. In this area, questions which initially seem to be en-
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tirely straightforward soon tum out to be maddeningly tortuous,
and teeming with nearly insoluble problems of measurement and
interpretation. Consider whether men are more aggressive than women. One would certainly think so, on the basis of common observation, or such indices as the statistics on assault and disorderly
conduct, or preferences in spectator sport. Yet when we approach
the question analytically, matters do not seem at all straightforward. What do we mean by aggression? Do we mean physical violence or verbal abuse? Do we mean violence alone or such qualities
as competitiveness or assertiveness? And how do you measure
them? These questions or others like them have come to dominate
the literature on sex differences and aggressiveness, which has further evolved into a group of sub-literatures exploring and arguing
about fairly narrow matters of research design and the like.
That is the inevitable evolution in all areas of research, and
should not distress us. Yet one senses that on this topic the evolution is being guided not so much by a more-or-less disinterested
wish to clarify the issues as by the wish to substitute a new set of
stereotypes for the ones we already have in place. What we now
find in the literature influenced by feminist doctrine is that aggressiveness-as-violence is thought to be a masculine quality, whereas
aggressiveness-by-assertiveness is thought not to be differentiated by
sex. One can make a plausible case for that construction; but then
one can make equally plausible cases for a number of entirely different constructions. The state of the literature, here as elsewhere, is
so jumbled as to allow the findings to be arranged and interpreted
almost at will.
The "gender and aggression" topic is more or less typical,
neither the worst nor the best example of the problems involved in
obtaining secure knowledge on difficult topics, and of the compounding of those problems when ideological passions are on the
loose. It has seemed to me that any survey of the sex differences
literature, prepared for a general audience, entirely misses the point,
since an honest report of most topics within the domain would have
to say something like: "This is the little that we know. The rest is
speculation or pretense or wishful thinking. You do well to take it
all with a grain of salt." It seems far more useful to look closely at a
representative topic, to examine the state of the knowledge, to look
at the controversies and why they exist, and in general to introduce
the reader to a necessary skepticism.
Let us consider a fairly simple question-sex differences in
mathematical ability-where the dependent variable is relatively
easy to measure, where the differences between the sexes are well
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established, and where the major desideratum-an improvement in
female achievement-is universally accepted. It is also a topic
where we have had, again relatively speaking, an abundance of research, enough so that the conflicts and disagreements that have
emerged cannot be written off as a result of our ignorance, as is so
often the case in the sex differences literature.
Julian Stanley and Camille Benbow, psychologists at Johns
Hopkins University, are our leading scholars in the study of mathematical precocity. For some years they have devoted themselves to
the question of early mathematical achievement-how to recognize
it, how to cultivate it, and beyond that, the lessons to be learned
about the origins and nurturance of mathematical and scientific talent in general. They have been working for nearly fifteen years to
discover ways of identifying young talent and understanding its
evolution: academic programs chosen, the effectiveness of acceleration and enrichment courses, the progress through high school, college, and early career.
From the beginning the emphasis has been on precocity itself,
not on gender, but the fact of sex differences has become salient for
two reasons: (1) it became evident that talented girls were far less
likely to skip grades or take advanced classes, some indication of an
absence of drive or encouragement or opportunity; (2) there were
far fewer girls to be found at the very top in mathematical aptitude.
Although on the whole boys and girls do not differ by a wide margin, there are astonishing differences at the highest levels of aptitude. In early adolescence, boys are represented ten or twelve times
more often than girls at the highest levels of the test employed (and
in the latest figures reported the ratio is 17: 1). They feel that this is
a datum of great social importance, since innovators in science and
technology are drawn from the ranks of the highly talented, most of
whom were precocious. For that reason, the modest advantage in
boys generally may be of less importance socially than the extraordinary differences at the top. They have argued for a concentration on that particular gender gap, given the need to cultivate
and recruit a scarce supply of the mathematically talented required
in the generations ahead.
Benbow and Stanley were in a good position to make this
point. They were not primarily students of gender, but of education; they had done more work on the question of mathematical
talent than anyone else; and-no small matter-they were female
and male, and hence were not easily accused of malice or invidiousness or sexism. Nevertheless, that accusation was made. Since
some of the popular media in reporting their findings had raised the
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possibility of a genetic sex difference, it was argued that if mathematical aptitude were to be widely understood as genetic, it would
act as a disincentive to girls, to their families, and to schools. Benbow and Stanley replied that first, they had done more to stimulate
mathematical learning, in both boys and girls, than anyone else; second, that they had not themselves raised the issue of a "math gene,"
third, their own view held that a mixture of exogenous and endogenous influences were involved.
So despite the bitterness between the adversaries, both agree-indeed, both aver-that there almost certainly is an interaction between nature and nurture. They also agree that the relative degree
of influence cannot be measured with any precision, now or in the
immediate future. They also agree that efforts at remediation could
make a difference, and ought to be tried. In short, they agree that,
speaking practically, one must be environmentalist, that is, if one is
to improve the performance in girls one must concentrate upon "social reality." And it is at this point that the truly difficult question
appears, since it soon becomes evident that we have no clear idea
what comprises that reality.
There are two major ways in which "environment" might influence mathematical performance: through socialization, the myriad ways in which the family and other institutions form the total
personality; and through situation-the pressures, constraints, opportunities, and incentives of the here and now. When we look to
socialization as the key, we must choose among a vast array of possibilities. Is the clue to be found in cognition-are boys and girls
perhaps being encouraged to think differently, boys being rewarded
for logical as against expressive thought, or for playing number
rather than word games? Might the differences have to do with the
motivation each sex is permitted-girls, let us say, being forbidden
competitiveness? The problem may lie in expectations-teachers,
believing that girls cannot do well in mathematics, communicate
these expectations to them, thereby inducing a self-fulfilling prophecy. Or it may be that girls and boys, looking at the occupational
world they are about to enter, make commitments of effort and ambition based on an appraisal of the opportunities.
One gets a sense of the problem by looking at some of the variables just mentioned. Think how difficult it is to measure almost
any aspect of the differential rearing of the sexes. The most economical way is some survey or interview of the parents, but that is
fallible for obvious reasons-false memory, self-deception, the wish
to say the right thing, and so on. Or one might spend a great deal of
time, as anthropologists do, in the close and more-or-less constant
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observation of a small number of families; but the problems there
have to do with the expense and effort required, and the limited
samples available. Even so, there would be problems having to do
with an unbiased assessment of the observations. Or one might
have occasional meetings with a larger number of families. Whichever method we choose, we will be getting only a partial picture,
since for a full account one would have to study families at different
social levels, of different sizes, with different structures, and at different ages. Even then, one could not easily make the case that
socialization, or any particular aspect of it, is genuinely influential
in the development of a given talent. One might do so, if the results
were decisively clear; but to my certain knowledge, that has never
yet been the case in socialization research on any topic.
Looking at the situation as a source of influence presents its
own formidable measurement problems. Thus, there has been some
attempt to directly observe the interactions among youngsters, or
between youngsters and significant adults, sometimes preserving
more-or-less "true life" situations, but more often setting up controlled experimental situations and observing behavior within these.
Reviewing the results of these experiments, we soon become aware
that there are often no strong correlations among situations, or between experimental behavior and real life behavior, or between experimental behavior and various measures of traits or abilities.
Furthermore, even the most carefully crafted laboratory experiment, one which finds stable differences between males and females,
may not find those at different ages, or given different conditions
(such as the tasks given), or when conducted by different experimenters (there being, it now appears, a tendency for both men and
women researchers to emerge with findings favorable to their own
genders).
Does this account exaggerate the complexities? If anything, it
understates them. For example, the best current model of academic
choice-itself only one part of the larger question of talent and its
training-provides for eleven general categories of variables, most
of these subdivided, making more than twenty that would have to
be defined, measured reliably, with the interrelationships plotted.
Even so, it omits several variables which would seem to be necessary for an adequate picture.
Even when we achieve a plausible map of the variables we need
to know about, we meet another problem far more serious than is
generally recognized: the instability of findings from study to study.
Seemingly straightforward relationships tend to lead to murky findings. It has been widely believed, for example, that mathematical
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talent has a great deal to do with spatial skills, but the evidence on
that rather narrow, focused question turns out to produce no strong
findings. "Thus it appears that the relation between spatial skills
and mathematical achievement is not yet fully understood." Needless to say, the uncertainties and confusions increase when we deal
with more complex relationships. Even when we find what seems to
be a clear set of correlations, it is not at all clear how we ought to
construe the causal sequences. One example: most (though by no
means all) studies show girls to be less confident of their math abilities, take fewer advanced courses in math, do more poorly, and
have lower expectations directed toward them by parents and teachers. One plausible construction of these findings holds that the indifference to math achievement in girls (or the active
discouragement of it) communicated by the culture through significant adults is the primary source of lowered achievement and loss of
interest. Yet one could turn that on its head without doing any
violence to the facts, arguing that girls on the threshold of adolescence, watching boys suddenly move ahead of them in math
achievement, lose interest and put their energies elsewhere. I
should say that I find the first construction somewhat more plausible than the second, but then again when we look closely at the
findings in this area, we find that there are many plausibilities which
turn out not to be true. One would certainly believe that there is an
association between the amount of math done by parents and their
children's atttitudes toward math, and plans to enroll in courses;
but there is not. Throughout the literature on this topic, we find the
belief that parents and teachers expect less from girls in math; in
fact, the better studies are unable to confirm that nearly universal
expectation.
Another confounding element has to do with historical
changes. When we deal with such variables as values, sex roles,
socialization patterns, economic incentives, careers, and so on, we
are dealing with matters which are highly vulnerable to changes,
both real and symbolic, in the culture at large. Almost all of the
literature I have surveyed on parental expectations for their children's schooling is over a decade old, and it is hard to believe that
attitudes have not changed in that period of time, especially given
the continuing increase of women in the work force.
Let us pause here to review what we know about sex differences and math ability. It amounts to very little. Boys and girls do
not differ much until early adolescence, and even then the gap between them is not at all substantial, although the number of genuine
prodigies is vastly disproportionate between boys and girls. We do
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not know why this is so, nor why pubescence is the apparent turning point. A biological explanation would seem to account parsimoniously for what is known, (it is my own preference, by the way)
but so would an entirely environmental explanation.
Once we get past these plain facts we find ourselves awash in
findings, which add up to very little when examined closely. Does a
child like math because he is good at it, or vice versa? Do math
teachers pay more attention to boys because they are boys, or because they are better in math, or because they are believed to be
better in math, or believed to be better when paid attention to?
Here, as elsewhere, the findings we have can be read variously.
They do not compel any specific model of how mathematical talent
is evoked, or enhanced, or directed. An existing model is imposed
upon the evidence, guides the interpretation of what is found, and
directs the search for relationships as well as the search for new
findings. Hence, research tends toward the confirmation of existing
belief, and although the controls of science are meant to minimize
that tendency, they do so only over the long run, and never easily or
perfectly. Given strong beliefs and frail evidence, there is all the
more temptation to employ a coercive model to order the evidence
and to formulate its meanings.
With respect to mathematical talent, the common belief has it
that sex differences are a function of differential (and invidious)
processes of socialization, initiated in the family, reinforced by later
agents, such as the schools, the intent of which is to inhibit expectations, and aspiration, and ultimately performance in areas deemed
to be "masculine" such as mathematics and science. If the socialization processes against math achievement in girls are so powerful,
why do they not work in childhood, when presumably there is a
greater malleability to adult pressure? Why are the data on parental pressures so weak and uneven? To return to the original Stanley-Benbow question, why are there such huge differences in talent
at the top, and not elsewhere? If there is indeed a conspiracy to
draw boys toward mathematics and girls away, what is the point of
it? Presumably to keep women "powerless." If that is the case,
why are they "permitted" to be better than men in verbal performance? It is the lawyers and memo-writers who rule the world-ask
any engineer.
It is discouraging to reflect that after so much work, we end up
knowing little more than we would from common sense alone.
Here, for example, is one of the conclusions of the most thorough
review of this literature we now have: "Thus, if a girl likes math
but feels that the amount of effort it will take to do well is not
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worthwhile because it decreases the time she will have available for
more preferred activities . . . she will be less likely to continue taking math. Similarly, if a girl sex-types mathematics . . . as masculine and not in line with her own sex values, she will be less likely
. . . to continue her mathematical studies, especially if she does not
expect to do well."
Of course we know that already. Furthermore, there is nothing at all sex-specific about that conclusion, since it also might apply to boys. Boys who like math but feel that the effort to do well is
not worth the time, if it cuts into, say, football practice, will tend
not to take math courses. And boys who consider academic study
to be unmanly, will be less likely to put any effort into school work,
especially so if they do not expect to do well.
The authors go on to argue that what counts is not so much
reality as the youngster's perception of reality-an arguable proposition-hence, adults ought to "become more sensitive to their own
attitudes toward mathematics and avoid perpetuating stereotypic
views of math achievement and [quantitative] careers... as inappropriate for girls and women." Yet if we look more closely at that
very modest bit of advice, we see that it embodies an idea of human
action itself quite arguable, to wit, that youngsters choosing a career
are easily dissuaded from doing what they truly want to do, thus
easily persuaded to do otherwise by enlightened adults. Why not
assume instead that youngsters, both boys and girls, are on the
whole rational consumers of careers, choosing through a calculus
made up of opportunities, incentives, values, and talent? Why assume only benighted teachers and parents determined to grind
down the young? We have, after all, seen during the past two decades some remarkable changes in the rise and fall, or fall and rise,
of gender distribution in a number of occupations, especially such
elite vocations as law and medicine. These changes took place because of other changes--economic, demographic, and legal-which
in tum produced still other changes, in opportunities and incentives. Yet much of the research treats the labor market and other
realities almost as epiphenomena, certainly as secondary, giving its
full credence to the idea that society is no more than a vast, coercive, relentless, and evil machine for the perpetuation of sexism, so
powerful that it must be countered by a vast and continuing propaganda campaign. That image of the American social order lies behind most of the research on gender and talent-inspiring the
questions it deems important to ask, the answers it expects to find,
and the interpretations it imposes on findings which, as we have
seen, are invariably weak or equivocal.
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Even so, the problems in literature on mathematical achievements are indeed minor when weighed against what we have in
most other areas. What do we have where the variable is intrinsically complex or ambiguous, or difficult to define and assess? A
good example is the current state of thought on the question of sex
differences in morality. To begin with there are a large number of
disputes about what "morality" really is-whether it is behavior, or
sentiment, or quality of thought. Beyond that, there are vastly complicated questions of how to approach each of these elements conceptually and empirically. The specific question most recent
research has concentrated upon is whether men or women have
"higher" or "lower" levels of moral thinking. Depending on the
instruments employed, one can demonstrate (a) that one sex or the
other is higher or lower; (b) that there are no sex differences; (c)
that there are differences, but only in quality or direction, not in
degree; or (d) that there are qualitative differences which prove that
either one sex or the other has a higher or lower level of moral
maturity. The reader unwilling to believe this account of the state
of the research is advised to study a recent issue of the scholarly
journal Social Research, devoted entirely to the question of women
and morality, containing a dozen or so contributions, all of them
focusing on essentially the same body of information, yet differing
so remarkably in approach and interpretation that the reader soon
imagines he has come upon a Tower of Babel.
The serious reader, trying to keep up with what is going on in
the social sciences, must rely upon the better newspapers, the
weekly news magazines, or those publications devoted to reporting
science for a general audience. So he will pick up the New York
Times or Newsweek, or Psychology Today, or Discover, and therein
learn about the breakthroughs, the recent findings, the new perspectives. The accounts given will likely be accurate, yet quite as likely
misleading, in that they rarely capture the provisional, tentative,
often ephemeral nature of the work reported. If you were to see the
same studies discussed in a technical journal-let us say, the Psychological Bulletin-you would probably learn that for every finding in one direction, one can discover another in the opposite
direction; or that earlier work has not been repeated, or is repeated
only under very special conditions; or that an entire genre of research has proved to be false because of newly discovered methodological errors. And it is important to bear in mind that the
"discrediting" of earlier work is by no means an occasional event;
far more often than not, the secular trend is for prior work to prove
insubstantial or incomplete.
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In short, secure knowledge is extremely difficult to achieve in
the social sciences. Minor variations in procedure can produce major variations in outcome. When findings accumulate in a domain,
they are often such a mixture of yeas and nays and maybes that the
scholar must order data through an interpretation others may find
false or idiosyncratic. When findings are unclear or uninteresting,
or when they conflict with current belief, the investigator will be too
disheartened to write them up, or the journals will be unwilling to
publish them. That is not conjecture: studies in several areas confirm that research which disconfirms the conventional wisdom of
the field is less likely to find its way into print.
These are the ordinary hazards of doing and using social science. They can be overcome, but only in the long run, when there
has been a considerable accumulation of work; we have in fact seen
that take place in such areas as psychotherapy and education, but
only when we have had hundreds of studies on a limited range of
issues. That is not yet the case with respect to sex differences,
where the quotidian difficulties of research are compounded by the
strong ideological interests at work. On these topics, the prudent
citizen ought not to believe what he reads, not fully, and those responsible for public policy should keep themselves fanatically skeptical when instructed on the latest lessons from social science.

